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Responding to Major Burn Disasters in Resource-Limited Settings:
Lessons Learned From an Oil Tanker Explosion in Nakuru, Kenya
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Elvis Otieno, BS, Miguel Trelles, MD, PhD, Nathan P. Ford, MPH, PhD, and Kathryn M. Chu, MD, MPH
Background: On January 31, 2009, a fuel tanker exploded in rural Kenya,
killing and injuring hundreds of people. This article describes the care of
80 burn victims at a rural hospital in Kenya, Nakuru Provincial General
Hospital, and provides lessons for care of a large number of burned patients
in a resource-limited setting.
Methods: Data were obtained from retrospective review from hospital
registers and patient ﬁles.
Results: Treatment was provided for 89 victims. Eighty-six (97%) were
men; median age was 25 years (interquartile range [IQR], 19–32). Half of the
patients (45) died, the majority (31, 69%) within the ﬁrst week. The median
total body surface area burned for those who died was 80% (IQR, 60–90%)
compared with 28% (IQR, 15–43%) for those who survived (p  0.001).
Twenty patients were transfused a total of 73 units of blood including one
patient who received 9 units. Eighty surgical interventions were performed
on 31 patients and included 39 split-thickness skin grafts, 21 debridements,
7 escharotomies, 6 dressing changes, 4 contracture releases, and 3 ﬁnger
amputations. Of the 44 survivors, 39 (89%) were discharged within 4 months
of the event.
Conclusions: Mortality after mass burn disasters is high in Africa. In areas
where referral to tertiary centers is not possible, district hospitals should have
mass disaster plans that involve collaboration with other organizations to
augment medical and psychologic services. Even for patients who do not
survive, compassionate care with analgesics can be given.
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B
urn disasters are deﬁned by mass casualties and major
loss of life.1 Severely burned patients are resource-intensive
to treat, often requiring intensive care, respiratory support, sur-
gical debridement, split-thickness skin grafting, frequent dress-
ing changes, intravenous pain medications, and psychologic
counseling. Complications include multi-organ failure and sep-
sis; patients are best cared for at specialized burn centers where
multidisciplinary teams of specialists work.
High-income countries have specialized burn centers,
well-developed referral systems, and mass disaster plans.2 In
the United States, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom, mobile burn teams consisting of sur-
geons, anesthesiologists, nurses, and respiratory therapists are
often deployed to the scene to assist in the initial evaluation and
resuscitation.3 Because each patient is resource-intensive to
treat, any burn center will become overwhelmed after just a few
severely injured patients, and in a mass burn disaster, patients
should be stabilized and then transferred to other facilities. After
a major ﬁre in Volendam, the Netherlands, the 245 victims were
triaged to 36 burn centers in 3 countries. Similarly, after a
nightclub ﬁre in Rhode Island, United States, 215 victims were
cared for at 16 burn centers nationwide.4,5
In contrast, few low-income countries in Africa have
deployable burn teams to stabilize patients in the ﬁeld. If burn
centers exist, they are located in urban areas, and their surge
capacity is quickly exceeded with a few severely injured
victims. Moreover, poor road conditions and the lack of
ambulances make rapid prehospital transport of multiple
victims difﬁcult. As a consequence, burn-related disasters in
Africa are often associated with a high number of deaths and
casualties.6 Kenya is a low-income country with nearly all its
burn care facilities in Nairobi. This article describes the care
of 80 burn victims at rural hospital in Kenya Nakuru Provin-
cial General Hospital (NPGH) after an oil tanker explosion in
Molo, Kenya, and provides some lessons for care of large
numbers of burned patients in a resource-limited setting.
PATIENTS AND METHODS
Setting
On January 31, 2009, a fuel tanker overturned near
Molo, a rural town 178 km northwest of Nairobi, Kenya.
Large crowds gathered to collect the spilled oil, and shortly
after, the tanker exploded, killing at least a hundred people.7
Among the survivors, 122 severely injured were transported
to the nearest hospital, NPGH, by bystanders and the Kenyan
Red Cross Society.8 Only 2 days earlier, a ﬁre in a Nairobi
supermarket killed 29 persons and injured at least 14.6,9
NPGH could not care for all these patients, and al-
though there were other hospitals in the province, a large
number of ambulances would have been required to move
patients to these destinations, and most hospitals had only one
Submitted for publication May 21, 2010.
Accepted for publication September 27, 2010.
Copyright © 2011 by Lippincott Williams & Wilkins
From the Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res-Kenya (E.K., I.S., W.K., M.H., E.O.), Nai-
robi, Kenya; Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res-Belgium (M.T.), Medical Department,
Gynecology, Anaesthesia, and Surgery Unit, Brussels, Belgium; Nakuru
Provincial General Hospital (G.M.), Department of Surgery, Nakuru, Kenya;
Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res - South Africa (N.P.F., K.M.C.), Medical Unit,
Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa; Centre for Infectious Disease Epi-
demiology and Research (N.P.F.), University of Cape Town, Cape Town,
Republic of South Africa; and Departments of Surgery and International
Health (K.M.C.), Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, Baltimore, Maryland.
Address for reprints: Kathryn M. Chu, MD, MPH, PO Box 27401, Rhine Road, Sea
Point 8050, Republic of South Africa; email: kathryn.chu@joburg.msf.org.
DOI: 10.1097/TA.0b013e3181febc8f
The Journal of TRAUMA
® Injury, Infection, and Critical Care • Volume XX, Number XX, XXX 2011 1ambulance or none at all. Nairobi had a high concentration of
facilities and staff with the ability to handle severely burned
patients. Therefore, 44 patients were airlifted by the Army in
one plane to Nairobi’s tertiary hospitals (Kenyatta National
Hospital, Nairobi Hospital, Mater Hospital, and Aga Khan
Hospital).9 It was a faster and safer method of transfer of very
sick patients compared with transfer by road.
Nakuru Provincial General Hospital
The majority of the 89 victims left at NPGH were
severely injured (60% total body surface area [TBSA]
burns). NPGH is the referral hospital for the district and has
four major departments—surgery, medicine, obstetrics/gyne-
cology, and pediatrics—and a 600-bed capacity. Staff general
surgeons and medical ofﬁcers performed elective and emer-
gency operations in four operating rooms. A small intensive
care unit (ICU) had ﬁve beds with two ventilators. Laboratory
capacity included a blood bank and basic diagnostic capabil-
ities (hematocrit, platelets, electrolytes, and creatinine).10
NPGH did not have speciﬁc resources to treat severely
burned patients.
RESULTS
Burn Care Response
The hospital was immediately overwhelmed by the
large inﬂux of severely burned patients. The staff were
occupied caring for the routine patients and could not attend
the critically ill newcomers. In the ﬁrst night, nine patients
died. The Ministry of Health made an appeal for international
assistance to Me ´decins sans Frontie `res (MSF), a medical
humanitarian organization that had been working in Kenya
since 1987. With the help of MSF, the hospital provided
curative care for the burn victims. An empty ward was
allocated to the patients and the ﬁrst task was to provide beds
and blankets. MSF provided a physician who began triage by
assessing each patient and recording the location and severity
their burns on an injury triage sheet. Intravenous ﬂuid resus-
citation was initiated using the Parkland formula. Later,
adequate urine output was used as the endpoint. Patients who
were able to drink were encouraged to take oral ﬂuids. This
was challenging given that many had bilateral hand burns or
were not strong enough to drink liquids independently. There
was a shortage of nursing staff to assist, and family members
had limited access to the burn ward. Pain medications were
started. Before the disaster, NGPH did not supply meals;
family members provided food for patients. However, burn
victims were given milk, eggs, vegetables, fruit, and high-
protein and high-energy peanut-based food (Plumpy’nut).
Burns were cleaned, debrided, and covered with sulfasala-
zine cream. Wounds were dressed with sterile gauze every 3
days or sooner where there were clinical signs of infection
(fever, discharge, and increased pain). Several teams of volun-
teer international and national surgeons worked alongside local
staff for 2 weeks. Thereafter, a dedicated MSF surgeon con-
tinued surgical care for an additional 8 weeks. Other nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) also provided physicians and
other medical staff to care for the patients.
Baseline Characteristics
Among the 89 burn victims treated at NPGH, 86 (97%)
were men; their median age was 25 years (interquartile range
[IQR], 19–32). Half of the patients (45) died, the majority
(31, 69%) within the ﬁrst week (Fig. 1). The TBSA affected
by burns was recorded for 42% (19 of 45) of the patients who
died and all patients who survived (44%). The median TBSA
for those who died was 80% (IQR, 60–90%) compared with
28% (IQR, 15–43%) for those who survived (p  0.001).
Twenty patients were transfused a total of 73 units of blood
including one patient who received 9 units.
Operative Interventions
In total, 80 interventions were performed on 31 patients
and included 39 split-thickness skin grafts, 21 debridements,
7 escharotomies, 6 dressing changes, 4 contracture releases,
and 3 ﬁnger amputations. No patients died in the operating
theater; however, 5 patients whose TBSA were 50% died
after surgical intervention (6–29 days postoperatively). Of
the 44 survivors, 25 (57%) had skin grafting with 13 patients
undergoing more than one graft. The majority of the 19
survivors who did not have skin grafts had burns 25%.
Long-Term Outcomes
Of the 44 survivors, 39 (89%) were discharged within
4 months after the event. Four patients remained in stable
condition on the burn ward. Nine of the discharged patients
were counseled at a local health clinic because of the ongoing
psychologic problems after discharge.
DISCUSSION
Fuel tanker explosions are common in Africa.6 The Molo
fuel tanker explosion was a mass burn disaster that resulted in
hundreds killed and injured. Mobile burn teams do not exist in
Kenya, but government and NGOs worked together to quickly
transport victims to nearby hospitals. Unfortunately, the number
of severely injured patients outnumbered available beds at burn
centers. Patients who needed specialized care but were more
likely to survive (TBSA, 20–30%) were triaged to higher level
care. More than 80 victims, including those most severely
injured, were left at NPGH.
The hospital was overwhelmed with the number of
patients and the severity of injuries. However, this experience
demonstrated that even in a resource-limited setting, a num-
ber of steps that can be taken to strengthen the treatment of
patients in a mass disaster. With the assistance of interna-
tional NGOs, curative treatment was provided despite limited
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Figure 1. Timeline of deaths after fuel tanker explosion.
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© 2011 Lippincott Williams & Wilkins 2resources. Although not a burn center, the hospital was
relatively well equipped and had a small ICU, an operating
theater, a laboratory, and surgeons and physicians. It was
recognized early that humanitarian assistance would be
needed especially for the increase in material and human
resources needed. MSF provided dedicated staff for the burn
victims so that the hospital staff could continue to care for the
nonburn patients. Hospital infrastructure was upgraded by
adding additional beds, medications, surgical capacity, and
essential human resources. A surgeon was dedicated to the
care of burn victims for 2 months to perform the multiple
surgical interventions. A physician, who did not have other
responsibilities in the hospital, coordinated the ward care of
the patients. A mental health team provided psychologic
support given the high risk of posttraumatic stress after this
type of event. From this experience, a number of essential
requirements for effectively responding to a mass burn disas-
ter in a resource-limited setting can be identiﬁed. These are
listed in Table 1.
Most of the patients were severely burned and half
died; three-quarters of all deaths occurred in the ﬁrst week.
Even in resource-rich countries, mortality in severe burns is
50%.11 In our setting, deaths in the ﬁrst 72 hours were
caused by the severity of the burns and limited human
resources. Once MSF intervened, maximal support was given
to each patient including ﬂuids, nutrition, antibiotics, wound
debridement, skin graft, and other surgical care. Compassion-
ate care was offered once the severity of a patient’s condition
surpassed existing resources.
After the ﬁrst week, mortality dropped to 27%, al-
though median TBSA was 39%. Deaths after the ﬁrst week
were usually caused by multiorgan system failure and sepsis.
Speciﬁc challenges in this context included the lack of med-
ical staff with burn experience, the inability of the laboratory
to process the high volume of requests, the occupancy of the
operating theater by nonburn trauma cases, and the lack of a
larger ICU. A major cause of morbidity was inappropriate
ﬂuid management. Many patients received less ﬂuid than
recommended for severe burns and developed oliguria and
acute renal failure.12 No dialysis machines were available.
Others acquired pulmonary edema after high-volume resus-
citation and needed respiratory support, but the ICU only had
limited space and one ventilator. Patients were anemic after
multiple wound debridements, and blood products were lim-
ited. Wound infections were difﬁcult to treat appropriately
without appropriate microbiology. Thrombocytopenia was a
major problem. Other studies have identiﬁed independent
predictors of mortality that include sepsis, ventilator depen-
dency, and low platelet counts.13
Although many of these limitations were because of the
lack of proper infrastructure or expensive monitoring devices,
certain inexpensive improvements may have improved care
such as point-of-care hemoglobin monitoring, glucometry,
better urine output monitoring, supplemental oxygen ma-
chines, and bedside pulse oximetry. Finally, an operating
theater dedicated to burn care would also have improved
outcomes.
Psychologic support was found to be an essential compo-
nent of the disaster response. MSF provided psychologists and
counselors who initially worked with the medical staff to ensure
that all burn victims had received analgesics, clean bedding, and
mattresses. Once patients were medically stable, grief counsel-
ing for victims and their families was provided. The importance
of surgical procedures such as skin grafts or amputations were
explained. Many patients expressed concerns about physical
disﬁgurement and returning to the community, and these con-
cerns were addressed in individual and group counseling ses-
sions. Vulnerable patients were followed by the Ministry of
Health counseling team after MSF assistance was completed.
Unfortunately, in a low-income country such as Kenya,
economic pressures often outweigh risks to personal safety,
even when the risks are known, and the potential for a repeat
of this tragedy cannot be ruled out. Ideally, Kenya should
have national disaster plan and provide appropriate training
for the staff. However, given the limited resources of many of
Kenyan government hospitals, this may not occur in the near
future. In the meantime, additional training in burn care
should be provided. Mapping of available organizations with
the capacity for disaster response and their resources are
urgently needed. Finally, networks between governmental
and nongovernmental institutions should be established so
that the interagency response to future disasters will be
streamlined.
TABLE 1. Lessons Learned for Treating Mass Burn Victims
in a Resource-Limited Setting
In the ﬁrst 24 h
Triage critically burned patients to specialized centers if possible.
Assess the facility and human resources. Find other stakeholders to
assist if not adequate.
Establish a burn ward and beds for all patients.
Immediate assessment of TBSA burned and degree of burn by medical
professional.
Place intravenous line, urinary catheter, begin ﬂuid resuscitation, and
record urinary output and ﬂuid received.
In the ﬁrst 72 h
Dedicate a medical team to care for burn patients. They should not
have other hospital duties.
Provide mental health support for patients and their families.
Increase nursing staff accounting for labor intensive daily dressing
changes.
Estimate the supply and medication needs for the next few weeks; ﬁnd
suppliers and donors as hospital’s stock will be quickly depleted.
Ensure operating theater is functional. Provide sterilization equipment,
supplies, and staff.
Establish blood bank if it does not exist.
In the ﬁrst week
Surgical debridement of all dead tissue including escharotomies as
needed.
Pain medications for patients with multiorgan failure (respiratory, renal,
and cardiac).
In the subsequent weeks/months
Provide physical therapy to prevent contractures.
Provide occupational therapy so that burn victims can prepare to return
home.
Treat sepsis.
Ensure adequate nutrition.
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